‘We wanted to be free as a nation, and we wanted to be free as women’: Decolonisation, Nationalism and Women's Liberation in Zimbabwe, 1979–85            1 by Law, Kate
Gender & History ISSN 0953-5233
Kate Law, ‘‘We wanted to be free as a nation, and we wanted to be free as women’: Decolonisation, Nationalism and Women’s Liberation in
Zimbabwe, 1979–851 ’
Gender & History, Vol.0 No.0 July 2020, pp. 1–20.
‘We wanted to be free as a nation, and we
wanted to be free as women’:
Decolonisation, Nationalism and Women’s
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ABSTRACT
This article examines one of the most intractable problems that a newly independent nation encounters; the
dissonance between the rhetoric of a revolutionary movement and its subsequent treatment of women in
nationalist and supposedly decolonial projects. In drawing on interviews and archival research carried out
in periodicals, newspapers and Hansard, the article examines the optimism, disillusionment and betrayal
of Zimbabwe’s women in the first decade of independence. Exploring women’s variegated roles during
the country’s war of independence, this article argues that many women believed that their participation
in national liberation would be a precursor to a broader programme of cultural and societal emancipation.
Yet, as is shown, governmental thinking placed women as consumers and not producers of new nationalist
culture. In particular, the grim reality of the situation was unambiguously shown just three years into
independence through ‘Operation Clean-Up’, whereby thousands of women in Zimbabwe’s main cities
of Harare and Bulawayo were indiscriminately detained with state machinery arguing that the women
were prostitutes, vagrants and beggars. A blatant effort to curtail women’s autonomy in urban spaces,
the machinations of ‘Operation Clean-up’ demonstrated an uneasy coherence between colonial and post-
colonial thinking regarding the ‘appropriate’ place for women in the new nation.
The national struggle, therefore expecially [sic] at its higher level, when it became armed national
struggle, became as much a process towards the liberation of the nation as towards the emancipation
of the women.
(Robert Mugabe, May 1979)
The demand by women for equality today is as much a threat to humanity as nuclear weapons are.
(Musekiwa Zenda, writing in Moto, May 1984)
The Liberation struggle raised women’s level of consciousness. But we need to remember that the
struggle is still very much alive. While we have the commitment of the government, we need to
make the most of it. We should make full use of our opportunities, because sexism, the oppression
of women, is still alive and kicking in Zimbabwe.
(Olivia Muchena, 1987)
Women were still considered second class [in the] social arena.
(Interview with Patience, November 2014)
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On 18 April 1980, official celebrations took place at Rufaro stadium, Salisbury,
to mark the coming of Zimbabwe’s independence. A host of international luminaries,
including Bob Marley, Indira Gandhi, Seretse Khama and Prince Charles, came to
enthusiastically commemorate, or at least cautiously observe, the final chapter of the
country’s colonial history.2 For the previous ninety years, Zimbabwe had existed as
Rhodesia, a self-governing British Crown colony that operated on the basis of white
privilege and black subjugation. In November 1965, this dichotomy was thrown into
particularly sharp relief when Prime Minister Ian Smith declared illegal independence
UDI from the British Crown in an attempt to stop the coming of black majority rule.3
Despite the fact that the country had been embroiled in a bitter and bloody civil war
for nearly fifteen years, Zimbabwe’s independence did not come through the barrel of
the gun; rather, it was achieved through negotiated settlement at the Lancaster House
conference.4 Although the meeting nearly broke down over the subject of land restitu-
tion, it succeeded in as much as all sides agreed for the necessity of a general election
on the basis of universal adult suffrage.5 While Britain was somewhat blindsided by
the eventual victory of Robert Mugabe and the Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU), the birth of Zimbabwe, as personified by the events at Rufaro stadium in
April 1980, had finally solved one of the most intractable episodes in the history of
Britain’s decolonisation. To many international onlookers, Zimbabwe’s transfer of
power was a dramatic success. Mugabe’s performance as international statesman, his
fraternal and reconciliatory rhetoric towards the beleaguered white minority, and his
cautious commitment to non-alignment assuaged international fears that Zimbabwe’s
future was one of Soviet-influenced despotism.
A nation ripe with possibility, Zimbabwe’s independence heralded a brave new
dawn that was rich with potential.6 Understandably, the country’s six million black
population had high hopes for what the future held, with a variety of interest groups
jockeying for position in the post-colonial dénouement. Drawing on interviews and
research carried out in periodicals, newspapers and Hansard, this article examines the
unqualified optimism, subsequent disillusionment and ultimate betrayal of the coun-
try’s women in the first decade of independence. Although feminist scholars have
trenchantly challenged the idea that the liberation of women is satisfied through de-
colonisation, scholars of the end of the empire have been remarkably slow, if not down-
right cynical, in embracing gender as a serious category of analysis.7 If we focus on
Zimbabwe’s process of decolonialisation as being bookended by the Lancaster House
negotiations and the celebrations at Rufaro stadium, then we risk investing too much
attention in the changing of one flag for another, in the ushering in of new politi-
cal symbols, and the exchange of one male elite for another. If instead we look at
the everyday experiences of women in post-colonial Zimbabwe, then we can begin to
question the very notion of ‘decolonisation’. A sympathetic reading of state actions in
the early post-colonial period would suggest that decolonisation was a time-extensive
process in which not all freedoms were immediately available. Yet, ‘during wars of
liberation women are not to protest about women’s rights. Nor are they allowed to
before and after. It is never the right moment. Defending women’s rights ‘now’ – this
now being any historical moment – is always a betrayal of the people, of the nation’.8
The transfer of power, then, should be seen as the beginning and not the end of the pro-
cess of decolonisation. In uniting ‘gender’ and ‘decolonisation’, this article maps new
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coordinates on Zimbabwe’s early post-colonial history. In doing so, it also encourages
other scholars of decolonisation to take seriously the potential of gender as a category
of historical analysis.
***
The article begins by examining women’s variegated roles during the country’s war
of independence, arguing that many women believed that their participation in national
liberation would be a precursor to a broader programme of cultural emancipation.9
Yet, as is shown, governmental thinking in this period placed women as consumers
and not producers of new nationalist culture. By examining life in the first rush of
post-colonial nation-building, a gendered narrative of nationalist control emerges in
which patriarchal prerogatives ‘continued unabated’.10 In particular, the grim reality
of this situation was unambiguously shown just three years into independence through
‘Operation Clean-Up’ – a concerted effort to subjugate women and consolidate state
power – whereby thousands of women in Zimbabwe’s main cities of Harare and Bu-
lawayo were indiscriminately detained with the state arguing that the women were
prostitutes, vagrants and beggars who did not belong in urban spaces. A blatant effort
to curtail women’s autonomy, the machinations of Operation Clean-Up demonstrated
an uneasy coherence between colonial and post-colonial thinking regarding the ‘appro-
priate’ place for women in the country’s urban landscape.11 As Joy, a feminist activist
remarked in an interview, the reasons for Operation Clean-Up were ‘complicated’,
but were certainly ‘embedded in patriarchy’.12 For scholar Lynette Jackson, ‘these
women’s only crime was that they had challenged traditional gender boundaries: they
had been seen alone at night […] and could not produce proof of marriage’.13 While
this article does not exhaustively detail the machinations of Operation Clean-Up, as
this has been done elsewhere, it rather locates reactions to the operation as a way
to understand why increased female autonomy – whether that was the wearing of
‘Western’ dress, migration to urban areas or indeed the ability of women to occupy
public space without being chaperoned – was believed to be such a major threat to
the project of post-colonial nation-building.14 In doing so, the article examines letters
published in the national press, as well as exploring parliamentary debates regarding
prostitution, sexuality and female respectability. The debates examined in the media
and through Hansard therefore serve as a backdrop to Operation Clean-Up, highlight-
ing how state-sponsored violence was used to control and circumscribe female au-
tonomy in the post-colonial period. By focusing on debates about women’s post-war
demobilisation, the politics of dress and the crisis their increased visibility provoked
(Operation Clean-Up), this article reflects on women’s vernacular or ‘everyday’ expe-
riences of a nationalist culture that has imagined clearly defined, but circumscribed,
roles for them.
In addition, in a broader theoretical sense this article further develops Sabelo
Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s contention that Mugabe’s years in power were characterised by
anticolonial nationalism, rather than a programme of decoloniality which would have
sought to ‘radically transform’ the newly independent state.15 More than this, the ar-
ticle examines the ways in which in the 1980s violence, as the ‘chief instrument of
statecraft’, was explicitly gendered.16 Unlike much of this scholarship that locates
the events of Gukurahundi as the first indicator of the future brutality of the Mugabe
regime, by contrast this article argues that the machinations of Operation Clean-Up
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should actually be seen as the first steps towards a future marred by authoritarianism,
violence and repression.17
A false dawn? Women’s participation in the struggle for national liberation
Although there had been sporadic guerrilla attacks since the UDI was declared in
1965, internal divisions between the two main African nationalist parties – the Zim-
babwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) and ZANU – coupled with the largely effective
counter-insurgency tactics of the Rhodesian Security Forces limited the implementa-
tion of widespread guerrilla warfare.18 This position changed, however, with the at-
tack on Altena farm in December 1972, an event widely seen as the beginning of the
Second Chimurenga, signalling an upsurge in insurgent activity and a new phase in the
war.19 The Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), based in Mozam-
bique, and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) based in Angola and
Zambia, as the respective armed wings of ZANU and ZAPU, adopted different strate-
gies of warfare, with ZANLA practising Maoist guerrilla tactics that concentrated on
politicising and winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the rural peasantry.20 Furthermore,
‘the war was essentially fought in Rhodesia’s rural areas, where the guerrillas felt safe
and sheltered’.21 While both ZANLA and ZIPRA infiltrated the country with combat-
ants who moved back and forth across the border, participating in hit and run raids,
by 1977 ZANLA had begun to place fighters in the country who participated in covert
operations to undermine the Smith regime. The success of a great many of these raids,
and indeed guerrilla warfare in general, was contingent on the support of the coun-
try’s peasantry, particularly that of rural women.22 Much of the literature on what has
been termed ‘peasant mobilization’ in colonial Zimbabwe has focused on women as
either active combatants or as passive actors back in rural areas.23 Yet, the fighting of
a civil war fractures any neat distinction between the ‘front’ and the ‘rear’, with the
Zimbabwean case being no different. What is clear, is that the war was fought and con-
ceptualised in many terrains with women contributing as cadres, as well as occupying
crucial auxiliary roles with regards to the dissemination of information and food. In
particular, the provision of food ‘emerged as a major theme of self-identification’ for
many women who participated in the liberation struggle.24 In addition to transporting
food to camps, women would often be woken at night by guerrillas who had come to
rural villages. As one woman, Jeni, recalled:
the comrades talked to us a bit. They said that they were our children and that they were
fighting for our country. They said they were not fighting for freedom, but for the freedom of
everyone in the country. Then they said, ‘please make us some food; we, your children, are very
hungry.25
Guerrilla fighters thus claimed legitimacy and were able to extract resources from
villagers by invoking traditional gender norms that emphasised women’s roles as nur-
turing mothers. It is particularly revealing that one of the most popular ZANLA slo-
gans during the liberation struggle was: ‘Forward with the Mothers! Forward with the
Cooking Stick!’ This is not to say, however, that providing food and supplies for guer-
rilla forces was not important work in undermining the regime, as this was a crucial
role played by women. As Margaret put it:
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I think if the women had not been there the freedom fighters would not have won the war. Women
did a great job. Cooking and providing food for the freedom fighters was a way of fighting
[…] sometimes while we were busy cooking, the soldiers could come and we had to run away
and hide […] the fact is we fought a war. Carrying hot pots of food up the mountains is no
joke.26
The successful supply of food was thus central to guerrilla survival, thereby placing
women ‘at the heart of guerrilla strategy’.27 While recent scholarship has emphasised
the value of a traditionally gendered activity, such as food provision, to the wider
struggle, much of the existing historiography has focused on women who became
active combatants.
According to Leda Stott, at one stage there were ten thousand female combatants
in ZANLA. As the vast majority were unmarried women and teenage girls, they per-
haps saw an opportunity to serve the (hopefully new) nation, whilst also experiencing
a semblance of personal autonomy away from familial oversight.28 Reasons for join-
ing the struggle were often varied; sometimes it followed a specific incident such as
the burning of a village, the murder of a relative or a particularly brutal visit from the
Rhodesian Security Forces.29 Other important factors included ‘a woman’s desire to
escape from traditional restrictions; low status, parental control and the influence of el-
ders […] following a lover, being inspired by a teacher or as a matter of conscience’.30
Daily activities often included collecting firewood, the cooking and carrying of food,
the singing of revolutionary songs, and fitness training. As Stott explains, although
‘camp life was theoretically equal for both sexes […] in reality women were still
discriminated against on grounds of gender […] women and girls were still heavily
conditioned by traditional and male decisions about what their roles should be’.31 By
contrast, Gisela Geisler argues that ‘gender differences were suspended in the camps’
with women achieving a level of parity with their fellow male cadres.32 Similarly,
Tanya Lyons sees the liberation struggle as a transformative period, in which gender
roles became increasingly ‘blurred’.33 Yet, although it is clear that some women who
became involved in the liberation struggle did momentarily elide patriarchal norms,
their positions were still circumscribed by men; indeed, they were mobilised through,
rather than against, patriarchy. Furthermore, the primary position of black women was
conceptualised as being the ‘mothers of the revolution’ with this symbolic exaltation
continuing through into the post-colonial period. As Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi
has put it, the subsequent side-lining of women in post-independent Zimbabwe was
merely a continuation of their treatment during the liberation struggle.34 When the
contribution of women was ‘selectively recognised’,35 it was done in the service of
militant and exclusionary nationalism.36
In 1979, as the Lancaster House negotiations were under way, Josiah Tongog-
ara, a prominent ZANLA commander, reflected on the position of women in the
post-colonial dispensation. ‘There must be a change to some extent: under the old
Zimbabwean system the man, as the hunter, held the gun. In the struggle, men and
women participated equally; both held guns and some women were promoted to
high rank. We can’t push them out.’37 At best, Tongogara’s comments reveal the
grudging acceptance that women had won by directly participating in the liberation
struggle as combatants; at worst they demonstrate that there was no guarantee that
the emancipation of women would be prioritised in the post-colonial dispensation.
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This position was unambiguously demonstrated through the experiences of many
demobilised female fighters who found that, once again, their struggle for freedom
had been deferred. Whether as auxiliaries or combatants, the participation of women
in the liberation struggle was implicitly (or perhaps cynically) understood to be part of
a broader programme of transformation that would address their historical subjugation
as both colonial subjects and African women.
Positivity then pessimism: Women’s experiences of demobilisation
Once in power, ZANU’s commitment to Marxist–Leninism continued with the party
adopting the two-stage theory of democratic revolution as the blueprint for national
development. This theory, also known as stagism, argues that in sites of underdevel-
opment (such as Zimbabwe), the continuation of capitalism is a necessary precur-
sor to a socialist future. In short, there will be no immediate programme of radical
redistribution. While the historiography is divided about whether or not ZANU’s com-
mitment to a socialist future was ever anything more ‘than a cynical slogan employed
to mobilise the masses’, the government did embark on a wide scale programme of
welfare delivery centred on health, education and labour reform’.38 Despite the hostile
reception that female combatants experienced after the conclusion of the liberation
struggle, the government did enact some legislation to the betterment of its female
citizens, including Equal Pay Regulations in 1980, the Legal Age of Majority Act
(LAMA) in 1982, the Labour Relations Act in 1984 and the Matrimonial Causes Act
in 1985. Yet, for Shereen Essof, the passing of this legislation constituted little more
than ‘affording women superficial access to state structures’.39 These developments,
coupled with a general sense of decolonial jubilation, bought the government time in
this crucial transition period.40
Understandably, women shared in this sense of post-colonial optimism. As one
ex-combatant, Viola Madhuka, wrote in an untitled poem: ‘Who am I?/ A strong
young woman/ aiming to play an important part/ in the new Zimbabwe.’ Similarly,
for Shumirai Nerupiri: ‘New Zimbabwean women, we were brave in the struggle./
Now we are creators, rebuilding our society. […] We mustn’t sit on our hands or lose
our courage. We must continue and be leaders of tomorrow.’41 During the course
of the liberation struggle, but particularly after assuming power, Mugabe uttered
a variety of positive proto-feminist statements which would have no doubt given
women such as Viola and Shumirai cause for hope. In 1982, he suggested that ‘the
principle of equality between men and women’ was a basic ‘political philosophy
of our government’. Going further, he added: ‘we learned throughout the liberation
struggle that success and power are possible when men and women are united as
equals’.42 Yet, the experience of a great many Zimbabwean women in the first decade
of independence contrasts remarkably with such sentiments. Quite obviously, there
is a clear disjuncture between laws passed in parliament and a shift in cultural atti-
tudes. As one woman put it, ‘what is the use of a new law if a woman has a stupid
husband?’43 In particular, old masculinist and patriarchal tendencies were quick to
reassert themselves with regards to defining appropriate female behaviour in the
new nation. During this period, three interrelated debates concerning ‘appropriate’
female behaviour and (un)respectable womanhood featured heavily in national public
discourse. By analysing articles and letters in The Herald, The Sunday Mail and
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Moto, the latter a periodical aimed at a black readership, Zimbabwe’s bright future
appears considerably bleaker when viewed through the words and experiences of its
women.
Originally founded in 1959 by the Catholic Church, Moto was associated with a
long anti-colonial tradition that became particularly pronounced during the liberation
struggle. In post-1980 Zimbabwe, the mandate of the magazine was to be ‘the voice of
the voiceless and defender of the downtrodden’, and along with the magazine Parade,
Moto was the only periodical that specifically targeted a black readership. While of
course all of these sources are mediated through editorial control, in this article they
are read as valuable indicators of public opinion. Newspapers and magazines, as media
scholar have long argued, do more than just report ‘news’; in particular, ‘letters to the
editor’ often form a ‘resistant genre of unrepresented voices’.44 This in turn, then,
speaks to the perennial feminist concern of the ability of women – whether physically
or rhetorically – to enter the public sphere, and, in the Zimbabwean case, the backlash
that this (perceived) increased access creates.
As in many other countries that have experienced revolutionary warfare, the de-
mobilisation and subsequent reintegration of soldiers is a complex process.45 As early
as 1982, one letter writer to Moto argued that she had become ‘increasingly aware of
a sort of “conspiracy of silence” surrounding the return of ex-combatants, particularly
female ex-combatants’.46 As Paul Themba Nyathi has argued, governmental planning
was short-sighted as ‘no attempts were made to prepare communities for the reappear-
ance of ex-combatants, nor was there any programme aimed at resolving problems
that developed in communities accepting back ex-combatants’.47 Receiving Z$400
upon demobilisation, former soldiers were thus expected to make their own way in the
newly independent nation.48 Once back in their communities, ex-guerrillas had to re-
learn how to live amongst civilians. As Shylet Mhaka put it, ‘my mother cooked some
rice and chicken for me to eat. Instead of sitting down, I took a plate, dished out my
food, then I started walking around the yard eating. It was not my fault because in the
bush […] we were always watching out for enemies’.49 Pressure was also exerted on
women such as Mhaka to distance themselves from their recent revolutionary pasts, as
she explained:
I went to town with my uncle Peter. He showed me nice dresses and shoes. I bought a dress. But
I couldn’t wear it because since 1976 I had been wearing trousers. […] I saw so many people
including women and girls who twisted their hair or brushed it well. At that time my hair was like a
guerrilla’s showing that I was from the bush. From that time I changed. I decided to do what other
young women were doing.50
The question of what ‘young women were doing’, or more importantly what they
should not be doing, was one that occupied many newspaper columns and inches.
Despite the sacrifices made in the service of liberating the nation, ex-female fight-
ers were routinely condemned for their refusal to adhere to ‘traditional’ values in the
post-colonial period. As Chipo Hungwe has persuasively argued: ‘women who had
been mobile or active as fighters during the war were now expected to return home
and take up traditional and domestic chores such as childcare and housework’.51 Pa-
triarchal prerogatives were thus quickly reasserted once the war was over. An article
in The Sunday Mail from November 1981 entitled ‘Are men fighting shy of marry-
ing guerrilla girls?’ deftly encapsulates the prevalence of the notions of appropriate
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gender roles shortly after the end of the war. The article, based on interviews with
men about female ex-combatants, detailed how men believed that they were ‘too in-
dependent, rough, ill-educated and unfeminine to make good wives’.52 Furthermore,
Mr Max Mataview, a twenty-two-year-old charge clerk, said men were not interested
in marrying the women ‘because they came back from the bush with many children’.
He also believed they considered themselves equal to men. ‘They think just because
they have taken part in the war that they are on the same level as the man.’ As Rudo B.
Gaidzanwa has so witheringly put it, female combatants were not considered ‘suitable
marriage material’.53
The issue of sexual equality became a regular feature in the pages of Moto during
this period, with a variety of opinion pieces highlighting the difficulties that demo-
bilisation and life in post-colonial Zimbabwe entailed.54 Moto acknowledged that re-
turning female fighters were subjected to greater societal opprobrium than their male
counterparts. Depressingly, some women had even gone as far as hiding and deny-
ing their role in the struggle. As one put it, ‘people become very guarded as soon
as they learn that one is a combatant as if it is a crime’.55 A close reading of Moto
therefore reveals that the country was beset by a variety of moral ‘panics’ with many
contributions demonstrating the depth and ferocity of debates concerning ‘respectable’
womanhood.56 Largely centring on female sexuality, commentators tied an apparent
rise in the number of abandoned children to the supposedly perfidious nature of fem-
inism. While concerns for women’s chastity are not the only way in which sexuality
arises as a point of contention in nationalist discourses, in the Zimbabwean case they
emerged as the prima facie focus for the (re)assertion of masculinist principles in the
immediate post-colonial period.
The price of liberation: Space, tradition and women’s lives in the 1980s
By 1988, Zimbabwe was widely feted as having one of the most successful family
planning programmes in the continent.57 However, greater access to birth control did
not necessarily correspond with an increased cultural acceptance of female sexual-
ity, as patriarchal fears that the use of contraceptives would see Zimbabwe become a
morally bankrupt nation continued to endure.58 Even though the country had a (theo-
retically) proactive and largely well-developed family planning policy, three years into
independence the country’s print media were awash with stories of ‘baby dumping’.59
Conceptualised as a direct outcome of women’s liberation and Zimbabwe’s appar-
ent concomitant sexual revolution of the 1980s, reported cases of child abandonment
signalled a rise in ‘unrespectable’ behaviour amongst Zimbabwe’s youth and were a
‘serious blemish on our claim to be a moral nation’.60
As Barker Chirisa and Tsitsi Nyanhete wrote in an opinion piece for Moto,
the majority of ‘dumped’ babies must be ‘illegitimate because if their mothers
had husbands who have jobs and gave them stable homes, they wouldn’t abandon
their babies’.61 Child abandonment was thus seen as being part of a broader moral
discourse.62 Speaking in parliament shortly after the baby ‘dumping’ scandal broke,
MP Dennis Divaris lamented the abandonment of ‘baby foetuses which are being
thrown into rivers, streams and so on’, before imploring his fellow parliamentarians
to ‘look at the surrounding reasons’ for the rise in child abandonment.63 Summarily,
the abandonment of children (and, relatedly, infanticide) was deemed to be both
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unfeminine and ‘un-African’.64 As one opinion piece in Moto ruminated: ‘nature has
endowed the mother with strong maternal feelings and a deep sense of protection
towards her offspring’. Women who abandoned children, or committed neonaticide,
were therefore ‘deviant’ because their actions were ‘contrary to nature’.65
When discussing ‘Baby Dumping’, Chirisa and Nyanhete’s article shifted at-
tention, albeit momentarily, to ‘unrespectable’ men. Although men were found to
be ‘acting in a very irresponsible manner’ by ‘using our ladies without serious
intentions’, it was ultimately believed that:
the blame cannot be entirely placed on our men, because some of our women go against their
cultures by wearing clothes that are unsuited to their position in society. Clothes like tight jeans
and see through dresses, which serve only to entice men. We cannot expect our men not to be
attracted to these women, because they are giving them an open invitation to make advances
towards them […] what has happened to our principles and the lessons we learnt from our grand-
mothers and mothers? Have we suddenly forgotten them in our race to become westernised and
urbanised?66
Matters relating to the nexus between African women, clothing and respectability
have been well documented by several scholars.67 In particular, as Margaret Hay has
noted in relation to the Kenyan example, changing patterns of dress, particularly the
adoption of ‘Western’ clothing, has been seen as a threat to patriarchal authority.68
In Tanzania, as Andrew M. Ivaska has argued, the rising number of African women
who chose to wear items such as miniskirts were seen to be ‘“indecent”, “deca-
dent”, and antithetical to Tanzania’s national culture’.69 In Zimbabwe, ‘clothing and
morality are intertwined. The miniskirt is the lightning rod of the storm over culture
values: those against it see it as indecent and un-African, while proponents argue
that it provides more coverage than the pubic apron and bare breasts of traditional
garb’.70
This apparent culture clash between African tradition and Western modernity con-
tinued to play out in the pages of Moto. In particular, the magazine ran pieces that
critiqued the way Zimbabwean women were represented in advertising campaigns,
expressing consternation for ‘adverts which portray women half-naked’.71 Based on
several vox-pops conducted in the second largest city in the country, Bulawayo, the
article reported that the portrayal of women as ‘commodities’ and ‘sex symbols’ was
a threat to the integrity of the entire nation as they failed to ‘conform to Zimbabwe’s
cultural and traditional customs’. Debates quickly shifted to the role of nakedness in
traditional culture. One unnamed woman did not:
see any reason why people are complaining about nude women on adverts; people seem to run away
from our culture and claim cultures which are not theirs. Our grandmothers used to put on umusis
nhembe [skirt aprons]; they did not wear blouses, they did not cover their breasts, and, worse still,
they showed their thighs.72
As scholars such as Allison K. Shutt have demonstrated, although historically
Africans were encouraged to adopt a ‘Western’ style of dress, they were also open
to criticism should they display signs of conspicuous consumption.73 Debates con-
cerning clothing therefore have a highly politicised history in Zimbabwe.
While the politics of dress might seem peripheral and quixotic when viewed
against the broader backdrop of national development, these issues speak to a broader
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ideological contestation concerning appropriate female behaviour and respectable
womanhood. In particular, the position of the Zimbabwean government was un-
ambiguously demonstrated in October and November 1983 during the course of
Operation Clean-Up, with the authorities ‘arbitrarily rounding up thousands of
women, subjecting them to humiliation and abuse, and detaining them in sub-human
conditions’.74 While the state attempted to legitimise the events of Operation Clean-
Up by arguing that those detained were prostitutes and beggars, the episode caused
many women to question the freedoms that living in an independent nation should
bring.
Once again, issues relating to women’s emancipation were at the heart of national
public discourse, with Moto taking the lead in condemning governmental actions. In
the December/January 1983–84 edition, the lead article, ‘“Operation Clean-Up” Takes
Women’s Lib One Step Back’, argued that the state’s detainment of women was not
only an unfortunate invocation of the colonial state (as women were detained under
the emergency clause of the Vagrancy Act of 1960), but also that the detainment of
women was completely indiscriminate as ‘a very wide cross-section of women was
picked up [… including] Students, nurses, married couples, industrial workers [and]
domestic workers’.75 Moto also noted how Operation Clean-Up was an attack on a
more significant female presence in urban spaces, as:
social changes, especially since independence, have meant that some women, particularly in cities,
have been able to acquire a measure of freedom denied to them traditionally such as the right to
live where they like, rights to work, walk unaccompanied, to choose their own associations and to
go about their daily lives without interference. These freedoms and rights have all been challenged
by the ‘clean-up’ campaign.76
As well as being an unequivocal display of post-colonial authoritarianism, the
events of Operation Clean-Up also fed into longer historical processes that have their
roots in the colonial period, further illuminating the complex and contested history of
the place of women in the country’s urban spaces. Any discussion regarding the divi-
sion between rural and urban space in colonial Zimbabwe must be cognisant of two
issues. First, the imposition of European colonialism wrought huge physical changes
to the country’s landscape, with successive pieces of iniquitous land legislation further
marginalising the indigenous peasantry.77 Furthermore, although Zimbabwe’s urbani-
sation ‘was classically treated as a phenomenon that mainly concerned only the white
population’, tales of the growth of Rhodesia’s “garden cities” routinely failed to men-
tion either the servants’ hovels at the back of suburban gardens or the squalid African
townships of the far side of the railway tracks.78 Second, the broader regional history
of labour migration meant that spatial land use was gendered as well as raced; histor-
ically, labour migrants were male. While men left rural areas to seek work – be it in
other parts of the country, or indeed migrating to neighbouring South Africa to work
on the Rand – it was believed that ‘respectable’ women stayed behind, as ‘family mi-
gration was discouraged, so sex ratios remained skewed towards men’.79 Yet, as many
scholars have shown, such neat distinctions between colonial Zimbabwe’s rural and
urban spaces, and indeed the perceived role of men and women within them, risks
blinding analysis to the significant presence of an African urban population made up
of women, as well as men.80
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Table 1: Official estimates of the adult African residents of the Salisbury municipal location
Men Women Total
1925 1,065 352 1,417
1934 2,578 806 3,384
1947 8,392 2,535 10,927
1956 31,636 5,169 36,805
Source: Adapted from Teresa Barnes, We Women Worked So Hard: Gender, Urbanisation, and So-
cial Reproduction in Colonial Harare, Zimbabwe, 1930–1956 (Portsmouth: Heinemann Educational
Books, 1999), as cited in Yoshikuni, ‘Black Migrants’, p. 113.81
While for Elizabeth Schmidt the ‘subordination of African women’ was constituted
through an alliance between European colonialism and African patriarchy,82 by con-
trast, Teresa Barnes rather reads the mobility of African women as dissension against
the colonial state.83 However, whether or not the colonial state and African patriarchs
liked it, women were always present in colonial Zimbabwe’s urban spaces. Most, if not
all, women were engaged in some kind of wage labour, either as maids, nannies, food
vendors, office workers, mapoto wives, shebeen owners or prostitutes.84 Although no
official figures exist that disaggregate the numbers involved in these occupations, a
great swathe of the literature suggests that historically the majority of women in urban
spaces were lawfully, and respectfully, employed.85 Yet, the idea persisted that ‘good’
women stayed in rural areas.
After 1980, ‘a new class of women had come to town, hoping for jobs in post-war
society’, yet for many the independent, urban-dwelling Zimbabwean woman was
something to fear.86 She undermined patriarchal prerogatives by leaving rural areas
and not partaking in the rural economy, and she threatened traditional customs such as
Lobola because she enjoyed independence outside of the family home.87 As an article
in Moto, ‘The Dilemma of the liberated Zimbabwean girl’, put it, the ‘new’ Zimbab-
wean woman ‘is cool, She is wanted. She is desired. And she is willing. No; not an
advert for the small car on American television. Take another guess. […] At 23, she is
an efficient typist and receptionist with an impressive array of certificates in secretarial
courses to her credit’.88 Fewer than ten months since independence had dawned, letters
appeared in the national press that equated ‘the break-down of old traditions and dis-
cipline’ with the free movement of women between rural and urban spaces.89 Women
who moved into urban spaces were therefore challenging confining gender categori-
sations, pushing against the very boundaries that equated mobility with morality. As
Hungwe has observed, the signifiers of being either a ‘respectable’ or ‘unrespectable’
woman still carried much traction in post-colonial Zimbabwe, with the term ‘pros-
titute’ being deployed at specific times, such as in Operation Clean-Up. Attributes
of a respectable woman included being fertile, participating in laborious agricultural
activities and staying in rural areas.90 This reasoning, as personified through the
debates concerning Operation Clean-Up, continued to carry much weight in the
1980s with the government arguing that those detained (approximately six thousand
people) were vagrants and prostitutes, and as such had no place in the newly imagined
nation.91
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Some women, however, did not shy away from challenging the state-propagated
chimera that those detained were ‘undesirables’. As one writer put it, ‘the operation
was ill-thought out and poorly organised, casting the net too wide to the point of be-
coming a police rampage’.92 Using the letter pages of Moto to access the public sphere,
‘Ex-combatant, Female’ wrote that she was ‘enraged’ by the ‘degrading and totally un-
justified humiliation [of women] at the hands of the police and soldiers who forced,
beat and generally mishandled women on the dubious allegations of being prostitutes’.
Legitimising and defending a female presence in public space, Ex-combatant, Female
reminded readers of Moto that the women who were detained were ‘our mothers, sis-
ters, wives, cousins, friends’. She concluded by questioning whether or not women
had also fought in the war to ‘liberate this country from tyranny and arbitrary laws or
am I dreaming?’ Disagreeing with ‘the practice of arresting single women as prosti-
tutes’, members of the Kubatana branch of ZANU’s Women League wanted further
clarity on how the police decided who was a prostitute.93 Other letter writers suggested
that women working as prostitutes were only doing so because of economic hardship
and the slow pace of national development,94 while other writers equated the machi-
nations of Operation Clean-Up as attacking women’s rights in general. In particular,
one group of writers demanded to know if women had been denied the right to occupy
space in Zimbabwe’s cities without a chaperone; if married women had to carry a copy
of their marriage certificates; whether or not all single women would automatically be
labelled prostitutes; and what the Ministry of Women’s Affairs was doing to inform
those deprived of their rights.95
In parliament and broader public discourse, the reputation of the detained women,
and indeed the legitimacy of government actions, were also debated at some length.
In the first instance, few parliamentarians actually expressed concern with the stated
aims of Operation Clean-Up. Mr Ntuta, professing that he wanted ‘a clear definition
of a prostitute’, went on to invoke biblical imagery when describing the situation.96
Some, like Mr Ndangana, felt that criticism of governmental actions was propa-
gated by ‘opposition group[s] […] here to formulate stories’, and that the government
was right to ‘encourage women to live decently’. For Ndangana, prostitution was a
global ‘problem’, yet because the Zimbabwean government had decided to act, ‘the
opposition have decided to talk about it and it has become the topic here’.97 While
some of the most trenchant criticism did come from (white) opposition members, in-
cluding erstwhile Prime Minister Smith, government officials were quick to question
their sincerity, thereby deflecting attention away from the issues that Operation Clean-
Up raised about post-colonial authoritarianism.
Disingenuous or not, opposition MPs continued to express their dismay at ‘this
deplorable exercise on what turned out to be the majority of completely decent
women’.98 One MP, Mr Elsworth, went on to explain that members of his con-
stituency who were detained were ‘decent women going about ordinary activities’.
For Elsworth, the events of Operation Clean-Up were an augury of a country ‘run by
mob rule’, which left unchecked would not encourage foreign investment because:
‘No one is going to bring his money into a country which he sees going into the Dark
Ages.’99 While Mr York felt it was ‘a laudable aim’ that was ‘well-intentioned’,100
he went on to argue that it was ultimately ‘a vicious attack against the women of this
country in general regardless of whether or not they have any connection or not, with
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prostitution’. As one interviewee, Patience, remarked, ‘women were always accused
of prostitution without considering that it takes two to tango. The cultural position
then was that women are the one[s] who entice men’.101 As Dorothy L. Hodgson and
Sheryl A. McCurdy have observed, the deployment of terms such as ‘“vagabond”,
“prostitute”, “wayward”, “unruly”, “indecent” and “immoral” are […] used to label
and stigmatize women whose behaviour in some way threatens other people’s expec-
tations of “the way things ought to be”’.102
The shame associated with such descriptions was noted by Brigadier Probert.
Arguing that the government had acted with ‘all the delicacy of a bull in a China
Shop’, he commented that ‘the great pity about this whole business, is that decent,
clean-living women are being arrested […] the tragedy is that when they come out
of these prison cells, to come home the mud will stick. A lot of women will lose
their reputation by what the government has done’.103 For Mrs Chinamano, the state
had targeted the wrong women as ‘prostitutes are educated girls who earn a lot of
money but […] they go about prostituting’.104 While it is difficult to substantiate
Chinamano’s claims, it is clear that the increased presence of women in Zimbabwe’s
urban centres had a bearing on such comments. As Barnes has suggested, ‘in urban
culture prostitution was firmly linked with a woman’s physical mobility, implying
that once she was moving around there was absolutely no doubt what she was
looking for’.105 Responding on behalf of the government, the minister of legal and
parliamentary affairs, Mr Zvogbo, challenged the representation of Operation Clean-
Up in the press, before going on to state that ‘the Government finds no necessity, no
expediency to waffle about the question of human rights and matters of human dignity
[…] we believe that all upright, law abiding Zimbabweans despise the practice of
prostitution’. Ominously, Zvogbo closed by explaining that those detained would be
‘taken, resettled and made to work, and work hard’. What is entirely absent from these
parliamentary debates is any challenge to governmental thinking that ‘prostitutes’
or ‘vagrants’ deserved to be targeted.106 Although historically the colonial state had
‘preferred to supervise rather than eliminate sexual deviance’,107 Operation Clean-Up
unequivocally highlighted the parameters of nationalist nation-building, setting an
alarming precedent for subsequent acts of state-sponsored violence.
Despite this, Operation Clean-Up was not without its supporters. One woman
wrote to The Herald expressing her support for the government, hoping she could
meet the prime minister and those involved to ‘give them 20c each for cokes in praise
of what they did about prostitutes’. Mrs Maps went on to explain how governmen-
tal actions were benefitting ordinary wives, as their husbands would be able to give
them ‘full pay for a change’. She went on to outline a further three advantages. ‘Men
are coming home earlier than usual because there is no one to entertain them in beer
halls and nightclubs’, numbers of ‘dumped’ babies would be minimised, as would
the spread of sexual transmitted infections.’108 Similarly, for Zhayerera Zhambira of
Gweru, Operation Clean-Up ‘instilled general confidence’ in the government. Ex-
pounding similar reasons to Mrs Maps, Zhambira added that the divorce rate would
likely drop, that ‘those women who have been sitting on the fence are more likely to
get married’, which would, in turn, improve ‘national discipline’ as children would
grow up with both parents.109 As Fungai George of Harare felt that ‘prostitutes are
unspeakably undesirable’, he congratulated the government, ‘pray[ing] this campaign
will go on until the final eradication of prostitution’.110
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Conclusions
Whether hamstrung by the reality of living in a post-colonial nation whose indepen-
dence had been negotiated through a settlement with its former colonial power, or
through the strictures of the adoption of structural adjustment -through the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund - in the late 1980s, in Zimbabwe there was a lack of political
will to meaningfully address women’s historical subordination; just one example of
the ways in which Robert Mugabe’s regime ‘never bothered to radically transform’
the inherited colonial state.111 This article therefore supports Carol J. Riphenburg’s
contention that in Zimbabwe the ‘benefits of revolution were tempered by the reten-
tion of masculinist principles’.112 As the Zimbabwean experience therefore suggests,
women are supposed to wait for their emancipation, as ‘pursuing that goal “too soon”
may rock the boat’ and derail national development entirely.113
While there is debate over whether or not women gained some level of equal-
ity during the course of the liberation struggle,114 traditional gender roles and pa-
triarchal prerogatives were quickly reasserted once the war was over. For all of the
state rhetoric that Operation Clean-Up was ridding towns of vagrants, prostitutes and
beggars, it baldly exposed the gendered nature of women’s post-colonial political
exclusion. For Stott, the Operation Clean-Up campaign was an attempt to silence
women who were beginning to demand a better life in Zimbabwe.115 Adding to this,
this article has argued that Operation Clean-Up is also a way through which we can
further understand the historic tensions surrounding the presence of women in the
country’s urban centres. Rapid urbanisation in post-colonial Zimbabwe, previously
controlled by legislation in Smith’s Rhodesia, saw unprecedented numbers of women
moving to urban areas. This mobility, however, contravened widespread expectations
that women who had participated in the liberation struggle should return to rural areas
and ‘take up traditional domestic chores such as childcare and housework’.116 The at-
tack on female autonomy, as personified through Operation Clean-Up, was therefore
as much about exclusionary nation-building as it was about forcing women back into
rural areas, to ensure their participation in the rural economy and to re-establish pa-
triarchal prerogatives. For many women in Zimbabwe, it is clear that when ‘the lustre
of independence wore off [in Zimbabwe], feminism seemed like cruel optimism’.117
Adding further weight to this, this article has shown that, at best, women were concep-
tualised as the nation’s mothers and not as its ideologues. At worst, they were ‘prosti-
tutes’ and ‘vagrants’ whose respectability and reputation were at stake in urban spaces.
As the debates outlined in the national press and Hansard testify to, the concept
of being a ‘respectable’ woman was still highly regarded in the newly independent
country. This pursuit of ‘respectability’ often meant that the contribution of women
who had participated in the liberation struggle was disregarded because ‘respectable’
women were not conceptualised as combatants; rather, they were symbolically exalted
as the ‘mothers of the revolution’ who crucially could produce but not consume new
forms of nationalist culture. Yet, as the letters profiled in this article also show, many
women were quick to challenge these shibboleths, voicing their dissatisfaction with
life in the post-colonial period.
Seeing decolonisation as a process and not a moment, this article has shed fur-
ther a light on one of the most intractable problems that a newly independent nation
encounters: the dissonance between the rhetoric of a revolutionary movement and its
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subsequent treatment of women in nationalist projects. In doing so, it has sought to
encourage scholars to think beyond the immediate decolonial moment. Fixating on
the transfer of power, it has been argued, blinds analysis to longer historical processes
that can help to explain the incomplete, fitful and contested legacies of decolonisa-
tion, such as those personified through the exigencies of women’s liberation. Almost
certainly, decolonisation could be conceived of as an interminable process through
which successive freedoms are (hopefully) revealed, yet the end of empire can be
more than a mere discursive threshold. As this article has argued, the only way to un-
derstand the porous boundaries between colonial governance and independent nation-
building – and the attendant political and economic changes that the transfer of power
brings – is to fully integrate gender as a serious category of historical analysis in the
toolkit of the historian of decolonisation. Only then will we begin to understand the
‘limits of liberation’.
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